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The German Soldier in World War I
The final "Argument of Kings"
R.H.Keller/ 2009

Organization and Service in the German Army

In Germany, by the constitution of April 16, 1871, every male
was liable for military service, from his 17th to 45th birthday,
commencing with the "class" of the year of his 20th birthday.
The 17-20 year olds within this category were classified as
Landsturm 1st Ban for "volunteer" purposes, home defense, or, as
in time of war, to fill active duty needs, and, in peacetime,
were only required to register.
On January 1st of each year, the Ersatz Commission, by public
notice, called for all eligible males to report to the Muster
District Office for registration on a specific date. Rosters
were prepared and a muster date with location was posted for the
"class". At the muster, physicals were preformed, after which
inquiries were held for excusing or accepting an individual based
upon personal hardships, etc. There was no substitution in
effect, and the only exceptions for military service were members
of reigning houses, those deprived by court sentences of their
civil rights, and those in jail!
Active military service was 3 years in the cavalry or mounted
artillery, and 2 years in all other branches, followed by 4 or 5
years in the Reserve, the Landwher for 11 years, then finally (in
the year they reached their 39th birthday) the Landsturm 2nd Ban
for 7 years. During the "Reserve" status, each man could be
called out for two annual training sessions called "Kaiser
Maneuvers", only being free from that duty when passing to
Landsturm 2nd Ban. This Landsturm 2nd ban seldom saw front line
active service, but still provided valuable services that freed
up military fit personnel.
If one chose to "volunteer" for active service before their
class was due, they had the advantage of choosing their unit of
service, and every opportunity was afforded to meet their
requests, thus a household could follow a family tradition of
service in a noted unit. Crown Prince Wilhelm of Prussia
commented in his memoirs that while commanding the 2nd Company of
the 1st Garde Regiment of Foot in 1902-1904, a number of his
soldiers were the fourth successive generation to serve in the
2nd Company of that regiment.
Another class of "one year volunteers" had to meet stringent
requirements of education and character, as well as pay for their
own uniforms, equipment, quarters, and rations. Many of these
men had completed higher professional educations, and became
officers upon completion of their active duty. Many professional
men, whose skills were required outside of active service, opted
for this service, and sometimes were required to serve only six
months. In opposite to serving less time, they could choose,
after 1 year, to transfer to the Reserves for two years active
duty, after which time they could become a Reserve officer,
liable for an annual 4-8 week training session for three years.
officers who retire from the Army with less than 18 years
service, pass into the Reserve or Landwher, according to age
bracket. The 1913 Army List contained 23,000 Reserve officers
and 11,000 Landwher officers, all trained and capable of quick
recall if war is declared. The Landsturm 2nd ban officers would
follow immediately.
If a soldier proved proficient enough in his active service,
and wished to pursue military life, they could, upon acceptance
by a unit, become "Kapitulanten", or regular professional
soldiers.
For the peacetime average German male, obligated military
service did not start until age 20, and was usually done in the
Spring with medical examinations, with actual training beginning
in the Fall of that year for the chosen few. The annual recruit
class was comprised of all men who attained the age of 20 in that
recruiting year. That "class" also contained men who were "put
back" for various reasons in previous musters of 1 or 2 years,
men who had postponed their muster for various reasons, and
"volunteers" of younger than age 20 men who wished to adopt the
army for their career.
Of this "class", during peacetime, not all would be accepted
for active service. Due to the huge number of men offering
service, the army could be very selective in nature, and if one
had a good enough excuse not to serve, they were usually passed
over or "put back". In addition, if one became qualified for
muster, the Ersatz Commission tentatively recommended men for
assignment to various branches of service based upon their
civilian occupation, special skills, and physical size.
At age 22, and not be accepted for service, you were
automatically put into the Untrained Landsturm or Ersatz Reserve
until age 45. A typical 1913 Army class, of which 305,000 had
been required (a figure increased by the German "Peace Strength
Law of 1912" to be effective by October 1915 even if war had not
broken out) is listed as:

20 year olds: 587,888
21 year olds: 380,331
22 year olds: 305,619
older & younger 54,181

Total 1,328,019

Of this lot, 118,300 were posted to the Landsturm, 86,911 to the
Ersatz Reserve, and only 305,675 to the ACTIVE units(or about 1/4
of those in the class). The remaining 700,000+ not included in
these figures were "put back" for any reason imaginable.(called
"Restanten"), and were not required to serve ONLY in peacetime.
Rejected men, which ran no more than 5 or 6 per cent, were liable
for no service. These again could be reexamined should war be
declared. Ersatz Reserve men were usually those who were fit for
duty but were excused for economical or minor physical defects.
This group would comprise those who would fill the ranks quickly
in time of war. They were liable for 12 years in this status,
and could be called up for 3 annual training sessions. Only a
small portion of these troops underwent any training. At the end
of twelve years, they went into the Landsturm 2nd Ban(39-45 years
old). IF mobilized, these Ersatz Reserves could amount to over 1
million men between ages of 20 and 32. The purpose was to have a
pool of fit men that could be trained and put into the field in
less than 3 months. In 1914, Germany could mobilize about 4.9
million men(of which 4 million were mobilized and carried the
Army through 1917) from a population of about 67 million. In
wartime, the term "Ersatz" means quite simply "Reinforcement or
Supplemental" troops. In peacetime, it often was applied o
Depot raised troops.
In the period of 1914-1919, about 400,000-500,000 men became
eligible each year for duty. Before that time, the figure was
higher, however, when war was declared, many men joined early.
At declaration of war, all transfers from one category to
another ceases except for those wounded or incapacitated. The
military machine quite simply stops and gets re-examined as time
permits. Men are not released until age 45. Men previously
rejected are re-examined under less stringent conditions to
obtain a huge pool of fit men. A new "class" is now called of
the 17-20 year old "Landsturm 1st Ban", medical exams are given,
and status is applied with a new set of criteria based upon the
numbers needed to fulfill the military requirements. Active duty
now includes the incorporation of all of the various reservists
who now join the class. Classes are sorted into "fit for
duty(sent to depot field units for outfitting and training)",
"fit for garrison duty in Germany or on lines of communications
in the field(sent to a Landsturm formation)", "fit for labor
use(also Landsturm)", or "unfit". Remembering that the "unfit"
pool is usually only about 5% (and even these "unfit" were often
re-examined and put into some sort of depot job), one can see the
wisdom of this very proficient, flexible and fluid system that
gave Germany a huge resource of manpower to run munitions
factories, depots, training centers, hospitals, etc. Only a
request from an employer could exempt a man from duty, and these
requests were often automatically re-evaluated each year as
wartime conditions changed. Bearing in mind that Germany had the
supplies need to put these men in the field, one can imagine the
awesome fright which France and England felt toward the German
War machine.
In 1914, huge numbers of volunteers of all ages came forward
and were accepted. 1915 did not produce as many, simply because
they had volunteered in 1914. After that, only about 5% of
eligible males volunteered.
At declaration of war, all Reserve and Landwher troops were
absorbed by the expansion of the wartime army in new "Reserve
Divisions". The 1914 class call-up was spread over a 3 month
period due to the huge influx of Ersatz Reservist and volunteers
who would have normally been excused from duty during peacetime.
All of the 1914 class was sent to the front after 3-4 months
training, giving the organizations in the field much needed
replacements and new reserve formations (Reserve Divisions 75-82,
and the 8th Bavarian).
After the class of 1914 was absorbed, the Landsturm 2nd Ban
classes were successively called up(39-45 age) through 1915 to
fill the losses of the winter campaigns. The 1915 class was
called up in April, May, and June of 1915, followed by the 1916
class in August and November of the same year, with the 1915
class sent to the front after 4 month's training, the 1916 after
an average of 4-5 months. Even this huge influx of men could not
offset the losses of 1915, so many "unfit" men were re-examined
under relaxed conditions, then the agricultural and industrial
labor forces were tapped with "quotas", which even extended into
the munitions factories.
The 1917 class was called up in January and May of 1916, 18
months early, but was used up quickly due mainly to the Verdun
and Somme battles. Part of this class received only 3 months
training.
The 1918 class was called in September, 1916, and January,
1917, two years early. The September group was in the front by
January, 1917, with the remainder completely used by July, 1917,
due to heavy losses at the front. This class comprised the new
"high" numbered infantry regiments of 442 and beyond(231-242, and
15th in Bavaria).
A small portion of the 1919 class was called up in January and
February, 1917, with the remainder in May-June of 1917, 2-1/2
years before its due date. Most of these troops went to the
somewhat quiet Eastern Russian front in order to release veterans
to the Western front to replace the Fall, 1917 losses.
The class of 1920 was called up in the Spring of 1918, again,
2-1/2 years before due date.
Prior to January 1915, all recruits to the Army went directly
to their regimental depot to join their comrades in the field.
Since February, 1916, recruits, after a 1-3 month training
session, were sent to field recruit depots behind the front lines
for additional or specialized training. All returning wounded
soldiers spent time at these depots to catch up on the latest
trench warfare innovations. Recruits could spend as little as
2-3 weeks at these training centers, depending upon their needs
at the front. Being only a few miles from the front, these
Depots could service Divisions or Corps with fresh troops at a
rapid pace, or serve as a quick "training" camp for special
assault operations. In some instances, these depot troops
garrisoned quiet sectors of front lines as part of their training
duties, and on several occasions(Cambrai and Somme), they were
caught up in the actual fighting. Wounded NCO's/officers, whose
training was valuable, were used for instruction at these camps,
and would be rotated forward again when fit for front line duty.
The average size of these units were about 1 battalion per
Division, or about 1200 men. Most men are drawn from the area in
which their home depot is located, but as the war progressed, it
became necessary to send men from other areas to fill
requirements. The Germans tried very hard to maintain a
companion "Esprit de Corps" within these Recruit Depots, thus
creating a brotherly bond of local fellow countrymen, many of
whom were family and friends. The depots traveled with their
Division when moved, with only borrowed "instructors" remaining
behind, or being "exchanged/traded" to stay with the unit as
allowed. Unfortunately, it was not always possible to send the
newly graduated recruits to companion units, so many of them
became distributed throughout the army as they left the recruit
depot. In many ways, this practice reduced heavy losses for
certain localities within Germany. The British learned the same
hard lesson with their "pals" Battalions.
As with any army, permanent "specialty" schools and divisional
training camps existed throughout the German empire and in
occupied territories(Belgium and Poland) and many new divisions
were assembled and trained at these camps. In addition, the
German Army had specialized training units that trained men in
the line.
A "Jugenwher"(youth Corp) was established in a local towns
throughout Germany trained boys 14-17 years of age in the use of
rifle and machine-gun, preparing them in basic military
discipline for their future role as soldiers. You might say it
was the "military" boy scouts!

-

A SOLDIER"S LIFE

In peacetime, training for a German recruit began in October
of the year of their class, having been examined and accepted in
the Spring muster.
In the infantry, assignment to a specific company was based
upon height. The tallest men were assigned to the 1st, 5th, and
9th companies of each regiment, the shortest to the last company
in each Battalion, the 4th, 8th, and 12th. Issuing of uniforms
was from the battalion supply depot, which drew upon the
regimental depot.
After several weeks of basic preparatory discipline and drill,
the imposing and solemn ceremony of the administering of the oath
was accomplished by 3 or 4 recruits at a time, who, in time
honored tradition, placed his left hand on the staff of the
colors and raised their right hand for God and the Fatherland,
after which the regiment was formed and addressed by the
regimental officer or a representative from Berlin, quite often
the Kaiser or some other member of the royal family, or possibly
the "honorary chef" after which the unit was named. This very
personalized ceremony made an everlasting impression upon every
new recruit who participated, and the solemn weight of
responsibility and duty that descended upon each man's conscience
was never taken lightly or easily forgotten, even under the most
trying of circumstances.
Their quarters consisted of large brick or stone barracks,
with guard rooms for 10 to 20 men. Each man had a wooden wall
locker for storage of uniforms and equipment, with rifles being
locked away in an arms rack. Bunks were wooden doubled decked,
with straw mattresses.
These brick wall enclosed military "Kasernes" were off limits
to all civilian and unauthorized personnel. Special approval had
to be granted by the Kaiser for any foreign officer to enter the
compound. There were usually three barracks buildings for an
infantry regiment, one for each battalion, with other
outbuildings providing two mess halls, 4 toilet buildings, a
drill building for inclement weather, and a number of other
buildings used for various fatigue duties, storage, and cleaning
duties.
Within each of the three 4 or 5 story barracks buildings was a
number of wash and storage rooms, equipment cleaning rooms, sick
room, detention room, officer administrative rooms, and a few
training officer/NCO rooms. Heat was provided by steam, or
individual stoves of tile or cast iron. Our large city US
National guard buildings would be comparable to these facilities.
The mess hall was next to the barracks where in most cases, the
soldiers ate their meals, with only a few instances of soldiers
eating in their rooms. In this mess hall was the battalion
barber shop, tailor shop, shoe/bootmaker, armorer shop, and
canteen, making it a hub of activity for the new recruits.
Meals were prepared in the kitchens by those who held
comparable jobs in civilian life. This rule of using qualified
technical personnel held true for each specialized service within
the compound. In some cases, their pay was slightly higher to
compensate their skill level.
Breakfast was usually coffee w/milk and rye bread with whatever
toppings were available through various sources.
The substantial noon meal was usually a cooked one with some
sort of stew(beef, mutton, or pork) prepared in large kettles.
The light supper meal was tea, coffee, or chocolate and bread.
Soup was served on occasions. Fruits and desserts were not
provided. The subsistence was meager, but it taught the soldier
frugality and endurance which would prove useful in the front.
The soldier was expected to add to his meal from his own pocket,
particularly breakfast and supper. The meager rations forced
families to send food, money and creature comforts to their loved
ones, thus greatly reducing the expenses of the government. In
addition, the families of the soldiers were forced to become a
part of the military machine by playing a very important role in
the subsistence and comfort of each of "their" soldiers. This
carefully crafted idea was not an accident, and it worked quite
well throughout the war. In the American Army, anything sent
from home was a luxury, but in the German Army it was viewed as a
necessity.
The day of a soldier began with the awakening of the training
NCO at 0445 by the barracks guard, after which the men were
awakened and did their morning washing, shaving, and barracks
cleaning and tidying up. At about 0545, the training
Unterofficers formed squads under arms in the barracks for
personal inspection. Ten minutes later the squads were formed by
the training First Sgt. and the corporals reported their squads.
The training lieutenants arrived at 0600 and the Sgt. reported
the company to the senior Lt. present. Officers then inspected
their respective platoons and the senior Lt. reported to the
commanding officer upon his arrival. First Sergeants then
reported all discrepancies, leaves, and company matters with the
commanding officer. The company commander handed out punishments,
made decisions of leaves, etc., then marched the men to the drill
field, returning at about 1115 hours for noon meal. At 1200 noon
the first Sgt received the next days orders from battalion
headquarters, which he reported to the to the company commander
and received instructions for the company. In the afternoon, the
troops were drilled on the parade ground, put through physical
exercises, or participated in other unit activities. Upon
completion of the assigned daily routine, troops returned to the
barracks and prepared for the evening meal, after which they were
free to visit the canteen where 5 pfennings bought half a litre
of beer and 1 pfenning a pipe of tobacco.
Actual individual barracks training, aside from the normal
drill, consisted of hygiene, physical training, bayonet drill,
and rifle manual of arms accompanied by practice sighting and dry
fire. The German soldier was probably more proficient with the
rifle than most armies on continental Europe. At about their
11-12th week of training, recruits began live fire exercises.
Meanwhile, weekly trips to the field with full packs increased
their stamina, with loads being increased to maximum 59-1/2
pounds by training's end. By the first week of February, the unit
was ready for inspection by the commanding officer, who judged
their proficiency and assigned those who passed the test to a
permanent position within the company. The new recruits then
went on to company level training which lasted 6 weeks, after
which they were expected to perform all aspects of company level
maneuvers and drills. Upon satisfactory completion of this
phase, the company went on to Battalion drill for two weeks,
after which they were reviewed and inspected by the Regimental
commander and other dignitaries such as General Staff officers.
Summer field exercise training began in May to prepare for
regimental inspection in August. Divisional exercises then
followed, and in September, each fall Corps maneuvers took place.
The famous "Kaisermaneuvers", or yearly mock engagements to which
many foreign heads of states and other dignitaries were invited,
involved 3 or 4 designated Army Corps. Winston S. Churchill
attended the 1906 & 1909 maneuvers, and Theodore Roosevelt was
the Kaiser's guest in 1910. A unit could win the coveted Army
Corps "Kaiserschiessabzeichen" (straight sided crown for Prussian
Army Corps), or "Konigschiessabzeichen"(swelled sided crown for
Bavarian, Saxon, or Wurttemberg Army Corps) if they excelled in
marksmanship and tactical maneuvering on a specially prepared
combat shooting course set up in the countryside with silhouette
targets. Machine gun units competed every other year. There were
also individual shooting "cords" to be won for marksmanship
within each regiment. September was an ideal month since the
weather was usually good, crops had been harvested, and the
soldiers due for discharge were in their last month of duty.
After these maneuvers, the units returned to garrison, those due
for discharge were released, and new recruits inducted.
The pay for a German soldier in 1904 was not high to US
standards, but very equal in European standards. The German
soldier was paid on the 1st, 11th, and 21st of each month. In
1904, the private received an equivalent of $1.65 at each payday.
The NEW pay scale, according to the April 1918 German Army
Handbook, lists the DAILY pay rates as follows (in "marks", with
one mark being equal to about 1 English shilling, or $.24 US):

Marks

Feldwebel 5.00
Vizefeldwebel 2.53
Sgt/Unteroffizier(after 5-1/2 years) 2.25
Unteroffizier 1.60
Gefreiter (dismounted) .75
Private(Musketier) .70

A private in the German Army made about $5.10 US per month(30-
day month), whereas a US soldier made 30.00/month w/an extra
$6.00 if on "foreign" service. This was comparable to other
European Army pay, and it taught the soldier to spend his money
on necessities and hardened them for tough times in the field.
Promotions were reserved for the career soldiers. Seldom did a
two year recruit receive any rank. The unit commander made all
recommendations for promotions when a vacancy appeared, which was
then approved by the regimental commanders. One year volunteers
with excellent records and at least 9 months service could be
promoted.

-

Organization in the Field

At the outbreak of WWI, Army strength stood at 30,037 officers,
106,477 NCO's, and 647,811 enlisted men(of which about 18,000 one
year volunteers). The Army also maintained about 40,000
administrative personnel.
The Kaiser was Commander in Chief of all Imperial German
Armies, except the Bavarian Army, which came under his control
only in time of war. All kingdoms and municipalities followed
the lead of the Prussian Armies, with minor distinctive uniform
designs and headgear helmet plate variations. The Armies and
units of states that had opposed Prussia in the Austro-Prussian
War of 1866, other than Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurttemburg, had
been absorbed or annexed to Prussia. Others more fortunate only
signed over their military rights. All contingents, except
Bavaria, were absorbed into the Prussian military machine.
Bavaria survived intact due to its close friendly ties with
France, with whom Prussia was on good terms at that time and that
careful balance could not be upset quite yet(until the Franco
-Prussian war of 1870).
A typical 1914 Army corps (of which there were 24) was
comprised of 2 infantry divisions, and 2 each artillery and
cavalry divisions. Each of these three types of divisions had
two brigades of two regiments each, thus within an Army Corps
there were 24 infantry Battalions, 20 cavalry squadrons, and 32
field artillery batteries. In addition, each Corps had a Jaeger,
pioneer, and train battalion, along with some other small
detachments of support for their troops.
The peacetime infantry regiment (and Jaeger Batln.) had a
machine gun company with 6 Heavy sled mount MG08 Maxim machine
guns(HMG) and one spare. In 1915/16, there was a need for
additional firepower, so special supplementary machine gun
sections consisting of 30-40 men with 3 or 4 guns were created.
These sections were attached as required to the infantry
regiments, and in many cases were immediately absorbed to create
a 2nd machine gun company per regiment, so that by the end of
1915, several regiments had two machine gun companies. During the
winter of 1915-16, after initial successes of the machine gun on
the battlefield, a new "Machine Gun Marksman Sections"(MGSS) were
organized and trained to fully exploit the full potential of that
weapon. These men underwent a 4 to 5 week school that
specialized in the use of the machine gun in an attack. These
newly formed 200 units were specially allotted to infantry
regiments engaged in offensive maneuvers or holding very
difficult sections of front line. They were first used at Verdun
in March, 1916.

In the beginning of 1916, the quantity of machine guns had
increased from 1600 in peacetime to over 8,000. Use of the
weapon had designated it an extremely important instrument both
in defense and attack. Machine gun production in 1916 rose to
about 3000 per month, with a figure of 14,400 per month reached
by Fall of 1917. By July of 1916, over 11,000 machine guns were
employed and would rise to 16,000 by the end of the year, a
figure which included many captured enemy weapons. September
1916 saw every infantry regiment with 3 machine gun companies of
6 guns each (1st, 2nd, 3rd), one for each battalion. The 2nd and
3rd MG companies were formed from all of the supplemental units
on the field. In addition, the MGSS sections were converted into
companies identical to the other MG companies. These companies
were then organized into an MGSS detachment of 3 companies each,
and acted as a reserve, usually for a Division engaged in active
operations. They proudly wore on their left sleeve a metal badge
of an MG08 heavy machine gun surrounded by a belt of cartridges.
By 1917, the number of guns per company was raised from 6 to
12. In addition, the new MG08/15 light machine gun (LMG)
introduced in 1916, was issued to all infantry battalions. By the
end of 1917, every infantry company on the Western front had
received 3 LMG, and some with 6, the number intended per
company. The units themselves provided personnel and training
for these guns, thus no extra personnel were needed.
At the beginning of 1918, each active division was expected to
have 3 LMG per company, 12 HMG per Battalion, and 36 HMG in a
marksman detachment, for a total of 108 LMG, and 144 heavy MG.
The total number of machine guns in use by January 1918 was an
incredible 32,000 HMG, and 37,000 LMG.

The Maxim MG08 heavy machine gun had a sight limit of 2,200
yards, muzzle velocity of 2821 fps, extreme range of 4,400 yards,
and could fire 400-500 rounds per minute. The 250 round belt
weighed 16 pounds and could be carried in single or double cans.
Weight of entire gun assembled was 140 pounds with 7 pints of
water. The ammunition used was ordinary ball (S.), armor
piercing (S.m.K) for use against tanks, loophole plates and
tracer (L.S.) at 1 to 10 rounds. Explosive bullets saw limited
use against aircraft, but was not in widespread use, being almost
entirely dropped by the end of the war as being ineffective as
intended.
Issuing of the MG08/15 LMG, a scaled down shoulder fired
version of the MG08 HMG design, began in March 1917 as a counter
measure to the .303 British Lewis LMG. With great determination
it can be fired by one man, but through experience and use, it is
somewhat impractical, however, it did fill a slot for a much
needed lighter assault type machine gun without a total redesign
and tooling process. It weighed 43 pounds with bipod and held 5
pints of water, and had all of the characteristics of the MG08
except in lighter form. Some internal parts are interchangeable
with the MG08 for simplification of production. Although
destined to take a side mounted spindle type magazine, it could
also be used with all standard belts and boxes of the HMG.

Both the MG08/15 LMG and the MG08 HMG guns were of the usual
high quality German craftsmanship, with all parts serial numbered
to their respective guns, including all spare parts. Both
weapons required great skill and care to keep them in functioning
order, and it was not unusual, after extensive initial front line
use, to have only 2 out of every 3 guns in operation at any one
time. Barrel accuracy was about 10,000 round for ordinary ammo,
even less for special ammo. It was not unusual for a gun to go
through 50,000 rounds during a major engagement, a usage that
does extreme damage to the fine-tuned parts within the gun.
Spring of 1918 saw the introduction of a light 9mm
submachinegun called the MP18 Bergmann, but only about 32,000
were produced, and they were issued out only to special assault
teams, with their full potential never really studied or expanded
upon before the war ended.

************************************************************

CREDITS

This information was complied mostly from government sources, but
the one source that I must credit most is "Regimental Steins" by
Major John L. Harrell, Ret., 1983. Long out of print, my copy is
worn and falling apart from use. If you can obtain a copy - do
so. His information in the beginning of the book is the best I
have encountered on understanding the German soldier prior to
WWI. His information was most valuable to compile the story. I
have told him this in person. Do not be fooled, the book covers
more than just "German Steins" and I use it at least once a week
for quick German Unit reference material.

-

The German Storm Trooper of 1917-18
By Richard H.Keller

I believe I wrote this for On The Wire many years ago. Anyway,
here it is agin for the readers enjoyment. Pardon the text
arrangement - our old computer in which this was written - Q & A
MS DOS - so in the transfer process into the newer language it
comes out differently. I just do not have time to fine tune it.

The December 1917 armistice with Russia released over 400,000
German troops to bolster the Western front in Spring 1918. This
was the largest and last supply of Fresh troops that Germany
could muster. It was their last chance for an all out Spring
offensive in 1918, hopefully before the American contingents
could be of any real use to the Allies. The newly trained and
battle tested "storm" troops would play an important part in the
Germany's last chance to either break the stalemate, or force
France and England, by sheer military strength, into an armistice
in Germany's favor.
The "Strosstruppen", or storm troops were created by order as
early as March 1915, with recruiting by mostly voluntary basis
only until late 1917. It's main purpose was to test new weapons,
both on and off of the battlefield, that might break the deadlock
of trench warfare. Most of these troops were drawn from pioneer
units, whose training included use of special weapons and tactics
to cut through enemy defense, creating a hole that the main
forces could utilize for a breakthrough. These early "special
forces" were the first to test the new steel helmet at Verdun in
1916, and later the body armor, trench shields, light machine
guns, and various small trench mortars, grenade launchers, and
specialized cannon designed for close quarter combat in tight
spaces.
After a series of successes and failures in late 1915 and
early 1916, the new storm troop tactics begin to yield successes,
especially in trench raids and special assaults, and every Army
on the Western front was ordered to send a contingent of officers
and NCO's to be trained in the new tactics, which they eventually
could carry back to their command an teach it a front line level.
By October 1916, the success of the operation was such that
General Ludendorf ordered all German armies to train and maintain
a battalion of storm troops. The concept of specialized forces
was not a new one among the existing Armies, as many units had
already organized their own form of "storm troops" to deal with
special weapons and tactics on their particular front, so the
ground work had been laid to aid in the formation of these
special units into the newly conceived Strosstruppen formations.
The new soldiers of these special units began to take on a new
appearance. Each soldier was left to distribute and carry his
equipment in the most comfortable fashion affordable, thus was
born the new lightweight "assault" pack to replace the standard
German fur back pack. They were the first to adopt the new steel
helmet as a standard part of their gear, much to the envy of
other troops who were still wearing the spiked helmet, and many a
Storm Trooper lost his new helmet to those men if not guarded
constantly. The 14" high boots gave way to shoes and leg wraps,
which was better for support and climbing. Their tactics included
a wide use of grenades, requiring them to carry a large supply
onto the field, usually in special double "grenade" bags made of
burlap sand bags slung under around the neck and under each arm.
Uniforms were re-enforced with leather patches at spots most
likely to wear while maneuvering on the field. Carbines,
pistols, trench clubs and grenades were standard armament for
these men. The MG08/15 light machine gun played a key role in
their operations to block off re-enforcements to positions they
had taken. Use of the Granatenwerfer (light bomb thrower) and cup
launchers could prepare an area for assault or pin down an enemy
force that was a threat to the operation. A platoon of 4-8
flamethrowers was usually attached to each storm battalion, but
their action was usually of short duration on the initial
assault.
The early years of the strosstruppen was relatively low key,
being that of special assaults on enemy lines to gain vital
information through booty and prisoners, or countering trench
raids conducted by the Allies. This period of training and
development was key to the part yet to come in the Spring of
1918. Only the British attack on Cambrai in 1917, and the
resulting successful counterattack led by the strosstruppen, gave
any indication of just how effective these new formations were
becoming, and the Allied intelligence communities were making
every effort to assess and counter this newly arrived threat with
tactics of their own. The Allies were well aware that 1918 would
be a crucial year, and their tactics had to be redesigned to meet
this new threat.
One of the major changes in storm troop techniques was the
training and resulting ability of NCO's to make tactical
decisions on the field. This often proved the difference between
success and failure of an attack. By 1917, training of new
recruits became focused on the new techniques. The usual
"drilling" of men was regarded as depriving them of their
individualism and pride in personal accomplishments which now
needed to take precedence over all other mindless training.
Those already in the front lines were rotated back to training
depots to rest and retrain in the latest tactics, with new skills
being taught by these new "stormtroop" instructors. Specific
objectives were often rehearsed on full scale models, with every
possible piece of enemy intelligence at their disposal to aid
their plan.
By 1918, every soldier was expected to be a small piece of
the "stormtroop" tactical advantage, and all were anxious to
practice their new skills. The prime tactical unit was now the
infantry squad, with 18 squads in a company, each one trained in
a specific task during an assault, 6 of them being machine-gun.
Moral became high among the actual "stormtroop" battalion as they
were no longer limited to sitting in the mud and taking whatever
was being thrown their direction. These highly respected men
were always a welcome addition to any offensive and were usually
in the midst of the hottest action or indirectly supporting a
major engagement with the newest weapons at their disposal. Most
engagements in which they participated were carried out at night,
with the force being withdrawn and out of danger by morning.
Their successes, no matter how small, were publicized from the
homefront to the front line newspapers, feeding a new spirit of
accomplishment and hope into a worried and anxious populace.
They soon became a romantic figure and Germany's last hope to
instill fighting spirit into it's last reserve of 1918 recruits,
with the ultimate hope that these new "supermen" could somehow
pull off the miracle that would break the stalemate of the
Western front.
The Ludendorf offensive Spring 1918 saw the greatest and last
offensive that it's armed forces could muster. The infantry
assaults were now based on the stormtroop principal of light,
fast moving small tactical units, or squads, to accomplish
flanking and infiltrating tactics designed to fragment and
isolate the opponents, leaving "mop-up" operations to the
following waves of infantry who could take advantage of their
sheer weight of numbers to demoralize and overwhelm those pockets
of resistance left behind. Their orders were to stop for
nothing, to advance regardless of the cost, counting on each
flanking unit to secure their respective goals. This led to
extremely heavy losses in the early attacks, with the rapid
advance often putting the attacking forces beyond the reach of
supporting heavy artillery needed to penetrate the heavier
fortifications behind the thinner front line resistance. Through
June of 1918, the Stormtroops hammered at the Allied defenses,
achieving limited victories but being unable to capitalize upon
those successes in the grand scale needed to break the deadlock.
The fresh supplies of non-essential material captured by the
Germans was so overwhelming that they begin to see the
hopelessness of their situation, as Germany was being starved
into demoralization, both at home and at the front, with no hope
in sight for relief. Of paramount importance was the realization
that the Allies were not on the brink of destruction as their war
ministers had preached, but were well supplied and prepared for
an all out offensive in 1918-1919 that would be unstoppable. The
last crushing shock was the undeniable truth that the great
tactical advantage of the Stormtroops was being hopelessly wasted
on the battlefield against an undefeatable foe to better position
themselves at the bargaining table and at a great cost in the
blood of Germany's youth. The plan of negotiating a peace
through victories on the battlefield did not match the stark
reality that the Allies were not on verge of defeat, thus the
great Spring Offensive ground to a halt, with moral at an all
time low.
The frontline stalemate, although altered in some ways,
remained unchanged, and the German troops went on a defensive
that would only delay the inevitable defeat to come. To their
credit, they continued to fight to the bitter end, organizing a
fluid in depth defensive system that cost the Allies dearly in
men and material, but through it all, the realization was driven
home to every soldier that their politicians had wasted needless
lives to achieve the resulting hollow victory. The Army, never
intending to give up on the battlefield nor negotiate in good
faith with the Allies, eventually turned Germany over to the
politicians to work out a surrender, thus setting the stage for
the military arm, which never actually surrendered, to place the
blame of a catastrophic defeat in the hands of the politicians
and not the Army. In doing thus, Germany was ripe for a new
birth of military patriotism to sweep it into a second world war,
and to eventually have happen what should have happened in 1918,
the total destruction of the German war machine along with the
mentality of the invincibility of its armed forces that made both
wars possible.

Casualties within the German empire during the four year
conflict amounted to over 2,000,000 men(exact figures were never
calculated), about 1/6th of those mobilized. A large part,
almost 40%, died in the Spring 1918 conflicts. Most casualties
on the battlefield(possibly as high as 70%), were caused by
shards of jagged metal from high explosive shells and shrapnel
shells loaded with hundreds of lead balls which burst over the
soldiers heads and showered them with a deadly rain of high
velocity pellets, much like a giant shotgun blast. With the use
of indirect fire, made possible by aerial observation,
quick-firing guns of all sides could lay down a wall of shrapnel
and steel that not even a pigeon could fly through, and maintain
that wall for hours on end. The French counted on this to stop
the German hordes, and it worked all too well.

It is beyond question that Germany had the best trained and
best uniformed army in the world in 1900. It's weapons exports
ranked it number one in the world, and it's military influence
spread around the globe. Twelve countries adopted the spiked
helmet by direct German influence (the united States in 1872 and
The United Kingdom in 1878).

One can almost sum up the military madness leading up to WWI
by reading the Latin inscription found on the barrels of the
Model 1896 77mm cannon - ""Ultima Ratio Regis". Loosely
translated it reads "The final argument of Kings". Up to WWI,
the varied kingdoms of Europe looked at their real armies as
nothing more than an extension of their soldiers in model war
games, a popular pastime of the period, with their brightly
uniformed "toy" soldiers battling on a mock landscape. The kings
of Europe vied with each other for the admiration of the world
through military pomp and pageantry, dressing their real armies
in a multitude of colorful and exotic uniforms and headdress,
preparing for the real thing when negotiations at the tables
failed, forgetting about how updated means of killing far
outweighed the reality of going to war under the traditional
tactics of parade ground maneuvers. This mentality of playing
"soldiers" on a grand scale was instilled in every country in
Europe when the war started, and even after the realization that
this was no small "king's" war, it was impossible to stop the
monstrous war machines once unleashed. The anticipated 3 month
victory turned into quagmires of depression and blood that erased
forever the idea of "playing" war without considering battlefield
technological advances. War now became death without actual
contact, with no eye-to-eye meeting on the glorious field of
battle as had been done by their ancestors and romanticized
through European literature. It became a harsh reality of death
under unimaginable circumstances that would crush a soldier's
spirit long before the shells could crush his body. After 1914,
the "king's" put away their old notions of war with their fancy
toy soldiers, packing them away on a shelf, never to be looked at
or played with again in the time-honored tradition of long past.
Future wars would be fought with carefully planned world
strategies and the best combined weapons technology - land, sea
and air. World War I was truly the last argument of the royal
houses of Europe, the last "argument of Kings".

Strength and Mobilization

In 1914 each regiment contained a regimental staff of 4
officers, 37 bandsmen, and 12 other ranks (w/16 horses and one
wagon), three battalions of 18 Lieutenants, a medical officer
w/assistant, paymaster, and 1054 other ranks.(commanded by
majors), of 4 companies each w/5 officers, 259 OR's, 10 horses
and 4 vehicles, divided into three platoons(zugs) consisting of 4
sections divided into two groups of 8 men each commanded by a
gefreiter., and a 13th company (MG) added in 1913 as weapons
became available.

Mobilization process activated 435 regiments of infantry:
218 regular army, 113 reserve, and 75 Landwher, the balance being
formed by grouping the 86 Ersatz Battalions into regiments. 166
from Prussia, 24 from Bavaria, 17 from Saxony, and 10 from
Wurttemburg.

By war's end, the number of infantry regiments had risen to 700,
364 regular, 197 reserve, 125 Landwher, 10 ersatz, and 4 reserve
Ersatz.

Other interesting WWI FACTS & FIGURES

CASUALTIES and COSTS

These figures vary from book to book, but this will give the
reader and idea of numbers and dollars involved.

Estimated cost of WWI in U.S.Dollars:

Russia $30,000,000,000
Britain 56,000,000,000
France 32,000,000,000
United States 40,000,000,000
Italy 12,000,000,000
Rumania 3,000,000,000
Serbia 3,000,000,000
Germany 45,000,000,000
Austria-Hungary 25,000,000,000
Turkey 5,000,000,000
Bulgaria 2,000,000,000

Total cost of World War One is estimated at $249,000,000,000

The cost in MEN:
POW
Mobilized DEAD Wounded Missing TOTAL

U.S. 4,272,521 67,813 192,483 14,363 274,659
*England 7,500,000 692,065 2,037,325 360,367 3,089,757
France 7,500,000 1,385,300 2,675,000 446,300 4,506,600
Italy 5,500,000 460,000 947,000 1,393,000 2,800,000
Belgium 267,000 20,000 60,000 10,000 90,000
Russia 12,000,000 1,700,000 4,950,000 2,500,000 9,500,000
Japan 800,000 300 907 3 1,210
Rumania 750,000 200,000 120,000 80,000 400,000
Serbia 707,343 322,000 28,000 100,000 450,000
Montenegro 50,000 3,000 10,000 7,000 20,000
Greece 230,000 15,000 40,000 45,000 100,000
Portugal 100,000 4,000 15,000 200 10,000
- - -
Total 39,676,864 4,869,478 11,075,715 4,956,233 20,892,226

CENTRAL POWERS

Germany 11,000,000 1,611,104 3,683,143 772,522 6,066,769
Austria- 6,500,000 800,000 3,200,000 1,211,000 5,211,000
Hungary
Bulgaria 400,000 201,224 152,399 10,825 264,448
Turkey 1,600,000 300,000 570,000 130,000 1,000,000
- - - -
Total 19,500,000 2,912,328 7,605,542 2,124,347 12,542,217

-
Grand
Total 59,176,864 7,176,806 18,681,257 7,080,580 33,434,443

*Canada sent approximately 800,000 men overseas, sustained
220,182 casualties: 60,383 dead, 155,790 wounded, 4,000
missing/prisoners. Australia sent 336,000 men overseas, sustained
290,191 casualties: 54,431 dead, 156,000 wounded 3,401
prisoners/missing.

Now one can see why WWII was slow to evolve. No one in the World
wanted another war, thus Hitler was able to rise to power
unchallenged until it was too late to stop his war machine from
starting a Second World War.

The Race with the Hun

The first half of 1918 was a race between Germany trying to
defeat France and England before America could rescue them. The
following is a summary of that race which America (to Europe's
relief) won. It is safe to say that without America's help,
Europe would have been a different world today.

1917 Ships Sailed U.S.Troops Transported

May 5 1,543
June 18 15,091
July 15 12,876
August 17 19,403
September 27 33,588
October 24 40,027
November 19 23,722
December 25 48,815

1918

January 26 48,055
February 22 49,239
March 45 85,710
April 63 120,072
May 141 247,714
June 128 280,434
July 147 311,359
August 140 286,375
September 129 259,670
October 127 184,063
to Nov 11 24 12,124
_________________
Total 2,079,880

Of these troops, 52% were carried by British ships but nearly 83%
were escorted through submarine zones by U.S. Naval vessels. The
U.S.Navy operated the transports which carried 44% of men. The
remainder of the escorts were supplied by the British.

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